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__________________ 
 
OPINION 
__________________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 This is a consolidated appeal by three codefendants, 
Glorious Shavers, Andrew White, and Jermel Lewis 
(collectively referred to as the “appellants”), who were 
convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, 
conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, 
witness tampering, and using and carrying firearms during 
and in relation to a crime of violence.  We will vacate 
Shavers’s and White’s witness tampering convictions and 
Shavers’s eight-year term of supervised release.  We will 
uphold the three appellants’ convictions on all other counts 
and will affirm Lewis’s sentence.  Finally, we will remand for 
the District Court to resentence Shavers and White in 
accordance with this opinion.   
. 
 
I. 
 
This case arose out of a robbery on November 8, 2005 
at a single-family house in North Philadelphia.  The house 
owner, Jeanette Ketchmore (“Jeanette”), had for several years 
run an unlicensed bar, or “speakeasy,” out of her basement.  
At trial, she described her activity as a party at which family, 
friends, and acquaintances would socialize and occasionally 
play cards.  The speakeasy was not open to the general public.  
Jeanette purchased alcohol at a retail store in Philadelphia and 
sold it without a license to her guests for $3-$4 per drink.  
The brands of alcohol sold included some that are 
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manufactured outside of Pennsylvania such as Hennessy 
cognac, Gordon’s gin, Seagram’s gin, and Taylor’s port wine.   
When the appellants entered Jeanette’s house on 
November 8, 2005 at 5:30 a.m., six to seven people were in 
the first floor dining room playing cards.  The parties dispute 
whether alcohol sales had ceased for the night.  The three 
appellants entered the residence displaying firearms and 
wearing dark-colored hooded sweatshirts with the hoods 
drawn tightly around their faces.  The appellants forced the 
patrons into the basement and ordered them to lie down on 
the floor.  One of the appellants went to the second floor and 
forced Jeanette’s son, Rickey Ketchmore (“Rickey”), to come 
downstairs to join the patrons.  The appellants then went 
through everyone’s pockets and stole two cell phones, a 
wallet, and approximately $121 in cash.  No money was 
stolen directly from Jeanette, however.  The appellants also 
rummaged through the basement and first floor of the house.  
Jeanette testified that the appellants went through her 
refrigerator and kept asking where the “weed” (marijuana), 
“wet” (PCP), and “oil” (heroin or PCP) was.1  Joint Appendix 
(“JA”) 1168–69, 1217.  They also asked Jeanette where “the 
money” was.  Id.
 
 at 1167.   
When the police arrived, the three appellants ran out of 
the house and down the street.  White was seen tossing a 
silver gun as he ran.  White and Shavers were arrested in the 
                                              
1  Before trial, the Government moved for leave to file 
a superseding indictment adding an allegation that the 
appellants attempted to steal drugs from Jeanette.  The 
District Court denied that request due to discovery violations 
and did not permit the admission of evidence supporting that 
theory. 
6 
 
area soon thereafter. White had two cell phones that were 
stolen from the speakeasy patrons and $49 in cash, including 
twenty-nine one-dollar bills.  Shavers had three live shotgun 
shells in his pocket and $87 in cash, including sixty-two one-
dollar bills.  After the police apprehended Shavers and White, 
they returned to Jeanette’s house and asked eyewitnesses 
Alberto Vasquez and Brian Anderson whether they 
recognized the two men sitting in the police vehicles.  
Vasquez and Anderson identified Shavers and White as two 
of the three assailants.  Lewis was apprehended years later 
after an investigation.   
 
Shavers and White were originally charged with 
Pennsylvania offenses and kept in state custody.  On March 
20, 2008, however, the United States Attorney charged them 
with robbery affecting interstate commerce, in violation of the 
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2, and using and 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2.2
                                              
2  The state charges were nolle prossed after 
commencement of the federal prosecution. 
  On July 
10, 2008, a superseding indictment added Lewis to the first 
two counts, and also added charges against all three 
appellants of attempts to intimidate, threaten, and/or corruptly 
persuade a witness in an official proceeding, in violation of 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(b)(1).  The witness intimidation charges were largely 
based on telephone calls that the appellants conducted on 
state prison telephones in which they made incriminating 
comments.  On August 20, 2009, the Government filed a 
second superseding indictment adding additional witness 
tampering counts and a count of conspiracy to commit 
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robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act against all three 
appellants.   
 A joint trial of the three appellants commenced on 
September 9, 2009 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  After six days of testimony, 
the jury found all three appellants guilty of the Hobbs Act and 
§ 924(c) violations, and found Shavers and White guilty of 
three counts of witness tampering each.  Lewis was acquitted 
of all witness tampering charges.  After denying the 
appellants’ motions for  judgments of acquittal, the District 
Court sentenced Shavers to 144 months of incarceration with 
an eight-year term of supervised release, Lewis to 141 months 
of incarceration with five years of supervised release, and 
White to 196 months of incarceration with five years of 
supervised release.  All three sentences included a mandatory 
minimum consecutive term of eighty-four months on the § 
924(c) count.  The appellants filed a timely appeal raising ten 
arguments that we will address in turn.3
 
   
II.    The Hobbs Act Convictions 
 
A. 
 
Shavers and White first contend that the District Court 
erroneously instructed the jury that a robbery need only have 
a de minimis
                                              
3  The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
prosecution of this criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 and we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 or potential effect on interstate commerce in 
order to violate the Hobbs Act.  While the appellants 
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acknowledge that our controlling precedent forecloses relief 
on this claim, they seek to preserve it for future review. 
We exercise plenary review over a challenge to the 
legal accuracy of jury instructions.  Armstrong v. Burdette 
Tomlin Mem’l Hosp.
 
, 438 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
Hobbs Act provides: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so 
to do, or commits or threatens physical violence 
to any person or property in furtherance of a 
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of 
this section shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  “Commerce” is defined as 
 
commerce within the District of Columbia, or 
any Territory or Possession of the United 
States; all commerce between any point in a 
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of 
Columbia and any point outside thereof; all 
commerce between points within the same State 
through any place outside such State; and all 
other commerce over which the United States 
has jurisdiction. 
 
Id.
 
 § 1951(b)(3).   
Due to the requirement that a Hobbs Act offense 
“obstructs, delays, or affects” interstate commerce, “the reach 
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of the Hobbs Act is coextensive with that of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution.”  United States v. 
Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The Commerce Clause delegates to Congress the 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  In United States v. Lopez, which 
involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 
1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A), the United States Supreme 
Court held that there are “three broad categories of activity” 
that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: 
(1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce[;]” (2) 
“the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities[;]” and (3) “those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.”  514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).  The Lopez Court 
concluded that the possession of a gun in a local school zone 
did not fall into any of those categories.  In particular, the 
regulated activity did not have a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce because “[t]he possession of a gun in a 
local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that 
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any 
sort of interstate commerce.”  Id.
 
 at 567.   
The District Court in this case instructed the jury on 
the interstate commerce element as follows: 
 
The third element that the Government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the 
Defendant’s conduct affected or could have 
affected interstate commerce.  Conduct affects 
interstate commerce if it in any way interferes 
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with[,] changes, alters the movement or 
transportation or flow of goods, merchandise, 
money or other property in commerce between 
or among the states.  The effect can be minimal
 
.  
It is not necessary to prove that the Defendant 
intended to obstruct . . . delay or interfere [with] 
interstate commerce or that the purpose of the 
alleged crime was to affect interstate commerce.  
Further, you do not have to decide whether the 
affect on interstate commerce was to be harmful 
or beneficial to a particular business or to 
commerce in general.  You do not even have to 
find that there was an actual effect on 
commerce.  All that is necessary to prove this 
element is that the natural consequences of the 
offense potentially caused an effect on interstate 
commerce to any degree, however minimal or 
slight
 
. 
JA 2016 (emphasis added).  Shavers and White argue that the 
District Court’s instruction was incorrect.  They interpret 
Lopez
 
 as holding that Congress may regulate only conduct 
that substantially affects interstate commerce, and may not 
regulate conduct that has a mere minimal or potential effect 
on interstate commerce.   
Our decisions have consistently and firmly rejected 
that argument.  See, e.g., United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 
754, 766 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have already rejected the 
argument that Lopez and its progeny require proof of a 
‘substantial effect’ on commerce in an individual case in 
order to show a Hobbs Act violation.”).  We have held instead 
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that “[i]f the defendants’ conduct produces any interference 
with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, 
subtle or even potential, it is sufficient to uphold a 
prosecution under [the Hobbs Act].”  United States v. 
Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation 
marks omitted).  A “reasonably probable effect on commerce, 
however minimal,” is sufficient to meet the interstate 
commerce jurisdictional prerequisite under the Hobbs Act.  
Urban, 404 F.3d at 763–64; see also United States v. Clausen
 
, 
328 F.3d 708, 711 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he District Court did 
not err when it instructed the jury that it need only find that 
each robbery had a minimal effect on interstate commerce.”).   
While we acknowledge that our long-standing 
precedent sets a rather low hurdle for the Government in 
Hobbs Act cases, we conclude that our interpretation of the 
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement is supported 
by Supreme Court precedent.  In Gonzales v. Raich, the 
Supreme Court upheld the application of provisions of the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., that 
criminalize the manufacture, distribution, and possession of 
marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana, 
holding that Congress possesses the “power to regulate purely 
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of 
activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”  545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (citing Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)).  Under the 
aggregation theory relied upon in Raich, the Commerce 
Clause supports federal regulation of an economic class of 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 17–19.  That is the case even where an 
individual crime on its own has only a minimal effect on 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 17 (“[W]hen a general regulatory 
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statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances arising under that 
statute is of no consequence.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
Even a potential effect may suffice.  Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Most directly, the commerce power permits 
Congress not only to devise rules for the governance of 
commerce between States but also to facilitate interstate 
commerce by eliminating potential obstructions, and to 
restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants.”).  We have 
opined that “the Hobbs Act regulates quintessentially 
‘economic’ activities” because “property crimes like robbery 
and extortion are — unlike the possession of a gun in a school 
zone or gender-motivated violence — indisputably 
‘economic’ under our post-Lopez precedents.”  Walker, 657 
F.3d at 179.  Like the statute in Raich
 
, the Hobbs Act 
regulates an economic “class of activities” that, in the 
aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  
545 U.S. at 17.  The proper standard for such activity, 
therefore, is exactly as the District Court articulated it to the 
jury.   
B. 
 
 The three appellants further assert that, even under the 
standard as the District Court expressed it, the Government 
failed to present sufficient evidence that their crimes had an 
adequate effect on interstate commerce to meet the 
jurisdictional requirement in the Hobbs Act.  On challenges to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply “a particularly 
deferential standard of review.”  United States v. McGuire, 
178 F.3d 203, 206 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999).  We do not weigh the 
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.  Id.  “[W]e 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
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government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
We “afford deference to a jury’s findings, and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.”  United 
States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation 
marks omitted).  We will overturn the verdict “only when the 
record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, 
from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  
 
Id. 
As we have just discussed, the effect on commerce of a 
Hobbs Act robbery may be shown by a “reasonably probable 
effect on commerce, however minimal.”  Urban, 404 F.3d at 
763–64.  Where the robbery “produces any interference with 
or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or 
even potential, it is sufficient to uphold a prosecution under 
[the Hobbs Act].”  Haywood, 363 F.3d at 210 (quotation 
marks omitted).  In United States v. Walker, for example, we 
held that the robbery of a drug dealer whose drugs originated 
in another state had a “direct nexus” to interstate commerce 
within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.  657 F.3d at 182.  By 
robbing a drug dealer, the defendants “directly [sought] to 
obstruct the movement of a commodity in commerce.”  Id.
 
 at 
181 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).   
In United States v. Haywood, whose facts are 
analogous to the facts in this case, the defendant was 
convicted under the Hobbs Act of robbing a Virgin Islands 
tavern of approximately $50–$70.  363 F.3d at 202.  We held 
that the interstate commerce nexus was satisfied because the 
tavern sold beer that was manufactured outside of the Virgin 
Islands.  Id. at 211.  Likewise, in United States v. Clausen, we 
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held that there was a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce 
where the defendants had robbed six businesses that 
purchased supplies from other states, and/or had employees or 
customers from other states.  328 F.3d at 711–12.  We 
underscored that “‘the cumulative result of many Hobbs Act 
violations is a substantial effect upon interstate commerce,’ 
and that substantial effect empowers Congress to regulate 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 711 (quoting 
United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 
1997)).4
                                              
4  In some cases, we have also turned to the “depletion 
of assets” theory to explain the nexus between the offense 
charged and interstate commerce.  In United States v. Urban, 
for instance, we reviewed the convictions of several city 
plumbing inspectors who had committed extortion, allegedly 
in violation of the Hobbs Act, by accepting payments from 
the plumbers whose work they inspected.  404 F.3d at 759.  
We held that the Hobbs Act jurisdictional element was 
satisfied because the extortion depleted the assets that the 
plumbers had available to purchase supplies made out-of-
state.  Id. at 761, 767.  We explained that “the depletion of 
assets of a person engaged in interstate commerce has at least 
a ‘potential’ effect on that person’s engagement in interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 767.   
 
  
That theory is not helpful here.  While Rickey testified 
that he saw one of the perpetrators holding two bottles of 
liquor during the robbery, the Government told the jury in its 
closing argument that those bottles did not leave the house.  
Thus, we do not rely on that testimony as evidence that 
proceeds of the business were stolen.   
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On this record, there was sufficient evidence from 
which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Jeanette was running a business that had the requisite 
nexus to interstate commerce.  Although the speakeasy was 
not a licensed bar, it was selling alcohol and the people 
playing cards at the time of the robbery were its customers.  
Jeanette had been operating the speakeasy for “years” at the 
time of the robbery.  JA 1157.  In her testimony, Jeanette 
agreed that the speakeasy was a business and indicated that 
she was making a profit.  Id. at 1156, 1163 (“[W]e would 
purchase more beer, alcohol, and sometimes I might have 
enough to pay a bill to help me with my — send my child to 
school.”).  Like in Haywood, Jeanette sold alcohol that was 
imported from out of state.  Although that connection to 
interstate commerce is admittedly indirect, it is no more so 
than in the cases discussed above and it is a sufficient nexus 
to interstate commerce under our jurisprudence.  See Urban, 
404 F.3d at 761, 767; Haywood, 363 F.3d at 211; Clausen, 
328 F.3d at 711–12; see also United States v. Elias
                                                                                                     
The Government also avers that White’s and Shavers’s 
possession of large numbers of one-dollar bills was consistent 
with the speakeasy prices of $3-$4 per drink and 
demonstrates that they absconded with business assets.  The 
appellants respond that the possession of many one-dollar 
bills is more consistent with the victims’ card playing.  Either 
way, it was for the jury to decide, based on the other 
evidence, which inference to draw from the denominations.  
Our role is not to weigh the evidence with respect to such 
factual questions so long as there was some evidence 
presented from which a reasonable jury could have found the 
essential elements of the crime.   
, 285 F.3d 
183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the interstate commerce 
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requirement for a Hobbs Act violation was met where the 
defendant robbed a New York grocery store that sold goods 
purchased in New York but produced outside of New York 
because the robbery “depleted assets that might have been 
utilized to purchase out-of-state goods”); United States v. 
Mapp
 
, 170 F.3d 328, 336 n.13 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the Hobbs Act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of 
a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state, without 
mentioning whether the goods were purchased from out-of-
state or in-state suppliers).   
There was also evidence here from which a rational 
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the robbery 
had an effect, albeit slight or potential, on interstate 
commerce.  For instance, Jeanette testified that, after the 
robbery, she limited her guests to friends and family and then 
shut down the operation completely a few months later.  At 
least one speakeasy customer, Alberto Vasquez, chose not to 
return and spend his money at the speakeasy after the 
robbery.  From that evidence, a jury could reasonably infer 
that the robbery caused the business to close.  Causing a 
business engaged in interstate commerce to close has, or at 
least potentially has, an effect on interstate commerce.  See 
United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the Government can satisfy the Hobbs Act 
interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery 
resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate 
commerce).  Moreover, such conduct, in the aggregate, would 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See Raich, 
545 U.S. at 17–19.  Although this robbery was of a small 
business that purchased alcohol sold in interstate commerce, 
if robberies occurred at and led to the closure of such 
establishments on a large scale, the effect on interstate 
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commerce would be substantial.  For that reason, the size of 
Jeanette’s business and the fact that the appellants stole only 
$121 dollars, a wallet, and two cell phones did not make this 
crime too small to satisfy the de minimis standard.  See 
Walker, 657 F.3d at 180 (holding that a robbery of $40 to $50 
satisfied the de minimis standard); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 
202, 211 n.7 (holding that the de minimis
 
 threshold was met 
by the robbery of $50 to $70). 
The appellants maintain that the facts here are 
analogous to those in United States v. McGuire, in which the 
defendant was charged with a violation of the federal 
explosives statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), for the destruction of a 
personal car that was used periodically by a small intrastate 
catering business.  178 F.3d at 211.  We held that the 
Government failed to establish the requisite nexus to 
interstate commerce because there was no evidence as to how 
often the car was used for the business or that a container of 
orange juice from another state that was found in the car was 
related to the catering business.  Id. at 211–12.  Thus, “the 
jury was required to guess at” the connection between the car 
and the catering business.  Id. at 211.  McGuire is easily 
distinguishable from this case, where the jury was not left to 
guess at the connections between the victims of the robbery 
and the business, and between the business and interstate 
commerce.  Additionally, it was undisputed in McGuire that 
the catering business did not lose money or customers due to 
the defendant’s conduct.  Id.
 
 at 211.  Here, to the contrary, 
there was certainly adequate evidence from which a jury 
could infer that the robbery was an attempt to — and did in 
fact — affect a business operating in interstate commerce. 
18 
 
 The appellants invite us to follow the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit and impose a heightened interstate 
commerce requirement when the victim of the alleged crime 
is an individual rather than a business.  In United States v. 
Wang, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
Hobbs Act interstate commerce nexus was too attenuated 
where the defendant robbed the owners of a business in their 
home.  222 F.3d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 2000).  The Court 
concluded that, when the Government seeks to establish a 
nexus between an individual victim and a business engaged in 
interstate commerce, “that connection must be a substantial 
one — not one that is fortuitous or speculative.”  Id. at 239–
40.  In Wang, some of the stolen money belonged to the 
victims’ restaurant that operated in interstate commerce but, 
because the robbery was of a home, the Government needed 
to do more than show that the victims owned a business.  Id.
 
 
at 240. 
The appellants also note cases in which the interstate 
commerce nexus was held to be too tenuous because the 
robbery was directed at an individual in his or her personal 
capacity rather than at a business.  See United States v. 
Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
interstate commerce nexus was too attenuated where extortion 
was directed at a victim who worked for an entity engaged in 
interstate commerce, but was aimed at him in his personal 
capacity, not in his official capacity); United States v. 
Quigley, 53 F.3d 909, 910–11 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
the robbery of two individuals en route to a liquor store did 
not have a potential effect on interstate commerce); United 
States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99–100 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the Hobbs Act did not apply to the robbery of a computer 
company executive in his home, even though the crime may 
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have prevented him from getting to work or making business 
calls because his “only connection with interstate commerce 
was his employment by a business engaged in interstate 
commerce”).  The appellants further argue that the connection 
must be even stronger when a home is robbed.  Indeed, we 
have exercised caution when assessing a Hobbs Act 
prosecution for the robbery of a home.  Jimenez-Torres
 
, 435 
F.3d at 7–8 (“Where . . . the crime concerns the robbery of a 
home rather than of a business, we approach the task of 
applying the de minimus standard with some caution, lest 
every robbery (which by definition has some economic 
component) become a federal crime.”).   
We decline to adopt the heightened standard set forth 
in Wang.  In this circuit, a robbery under the Hobbs Act need 
only have a “reasonably probable effect on commerce, 
however minimal.”  Urban, 404 F.3d at 763–64.  The 
“substantial” connection required in Wang has no basis in our 
case law and adopting it would contradict our adherence to 
the requirement that a robbery need only “produce[] any 
interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether 
slight, subtle or even potential,” in order to support 
prosecution under the Hobbs Act.  Haywood
 
, 363 F.3d at 210 
(quotation marks omitted).   
Moreover, Wang and the other cases in which the 
robberies were directed at individuals in their personal 
capacity rather than at businesses are inapposite.  The 
appellants here did not rob individuals in their personal 
capacity or in their homes.  To the contrary, the robbery 
occurred in Jeanette’s place of business, her customers were 
victimized and robbed, and there was evidence that the 
robbery targeted business assets.  Testimony from customers 
20 
 
of the speakeasy indicated that the gatherings at Jeanette’s 
were not merely social events with friends.  For instance, 
Vasquez testified that Jeanette’s house was “a place where 
people would go after time inside the bars that they closed up 
at 2:00.  You stop in for a couple drinks.  It’s known on the 
streets as a speakeasy.”  JA 962–63.  Likewise, Anderson 
testified that the basement was “set up like a bar” and that “it 
was a speakeasy.”  Id.
 
 at 871, 899.  Even if we assume that 
alcohol was no longer being sold at the time of the robbery, 
that disputed fact does not alter our conclusion, as the reason 
the victims were in Jeanette’s house was due to her business 
selling alcohol and they were still playing cards in the dining 
room when the robbery occurred.  Thus, there was sufficient 
evidence that appellants robbed individuals, but in their 
capacity as customers of a business.   
There was also evidence in the record from which a 
rational jury could conclude that the appellants targeted the 
assets of Jeanette’s business, not solely the customers.  The 
appellants had a meeting the night before the robbery in 
which they learned about a house with “a lot of money in it.”  
JA 1430.  During the robbery, they asked Jeanette where “the 
money” was and rummaged through her refrigerator.  App. 
1167–69.  The nexus to interstate commerce in this case was, 
therefore, more direct than in Wang and the other cases cited 
by the appellants.  See Walker, 657 F.3d at 181 (holding that 
the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce 
was “much more direct” than in Wang because, at the time of 
the robbery, the victim in Walker
 
 was selling illegal drugs 
that had traveled through interstate commerce). 
We recognize that this case stands at the outer limit of 
Hobbs Act jurisdiction and it is far from obvious which cases 
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are purely matters for state prosecution.  The Hobbs Act 
interstate commerce question must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis.  See Lopez
 
, 514 U.S. at 561 (noting that a “case-
by-case inquiry” is undertaken for statutes containing a 
jurisdictional element).  When we view the evidence in this 
case in the light most favorable to the Government, we 
conclude that there was a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce to support the appellants’ convictions under the 
Hobbs Act.   
III. The Witness Tampering Convictions 
 
Shavers and White next contend that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support their convictions 
for witness tampering.  Despite the considerable deference 
that we afford to a jury’s findings in reviewing a conviction 
for sufficiency of the evidence, we agree and conclude that 
the evidence in this case does not support the witness 
tampering convictions.    
 
A. 
 
In relevant part, the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982 (“VWPA”) provides: 
 
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, 
threatens, or corruptly persuades another 
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in 
misleading conduct toward another person, with 
intent to– 
 
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of 
any person in an official proceeding;  
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(2) cause or induce any person to--  
 
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a 
record, document, or other object, from 
an official proceeding;  
 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an 
object with intent to impair the object’s 
integrity or availability for use in an 
official proceeding;  
 
(C) evade legal process summoning that 
person to appear as a witness, or to 
produce a record, document, or other 
object, in an official proceeding; or  
 
(D) be absent from an official proceeding 
to which such person has been 
summoned by legal process; or  
  
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication 
to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 
United States of information relating to the 
commission or possible commission of a 
Federal offense or a violation of conditions of 
probation supervised release, parole, or release 
pending judicial proceedings;  
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).   
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Shavers and White were convicted of violating § 
1512(b)(1), which seeks to safeguard anticipated testimony in 
an “official proceeding.”  An “official proceeding” for the 
purposes of the VWPA is defined as  
 
a proceeding before a judge or court of the 
United States, a United States magistrate judge, 
a bankruptcy judge, a judge of the United States 
Tax Court, a special trial judge of the Tax 
Court, a judge of the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, or a Federal grand jury. 
 
Id. § 1515(a)(1)(A).  The VWPA explicitly provides that “an 
official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense.”  Id. § 1512(f)(1).  There 
does, however, need to be a connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the official proceeding.  In Arthur 
Anderson LLP v. United States, the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed convictions under § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B).  
544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).  The Court held that to satisfy the 
“official proceeding” requirement under those subsections, 
the Government must show a “nexus” between the 
defendant’s conduct and a particular proceeding.  Id. at 707–
08.  To meet that nexus requirement, the Government must 
prove that the defendant “ha[d] in contemplation [a] 
particular official proceeding” when he or she attempted to 
interfere with evidence or a witness.  Id. at 708.  The 
proceeding need not have been pending or about to be 
instituted, but it must have been foreseeable.  Id. at 707–08.  
Thus, the defendant “must believe that his actions are likely 
to affect a particular, existing or foreseeable official 
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proceeding.”  United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 125 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (citing Arthur Anderson
 
, 544 U.S. at 708).   
 While the Court in Arthur Anderson interpreted § 
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B) only, the Court’s analysis and 
application of the “nexus” requirement applies with equal 
force to § 1512(b)(1).  All three subsections qualify the 
prohibited conduct by requiring that the defendant target 
testimony or evidence in an “official proceeding.”  
Consistency demands that we apply the Arthur Anderson 
nexus requirement to § 1512(b)(1).  See United States v. 
Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 708 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
Arthur Anderson applies to prosecutions under § 1512(c)(1) 
because that subsection also “speaks in terms of the 
relationship between obstructive acts and a proceeding.”); 
Kaplan, 490 F.3d at 126 (noting that the jury instructions on 
the § 1512(b)(1) charge “undoubtedly needed to comply with 
the nexus requirement discussed in Arthur Anderson
 
”). 
Accordingly, the Government in a § 1512(b)(1) 
prosecution is tasked with proving that the defendant 
contemplated a particular “official proceeding” that was 
foreseeable when he or she engaged in the proscribed 
conduct.  As part of that requirement, the Government must 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the contemplated 
proceeding met the definition of “official proceeding” 
articulated in § 1515(a)(1)(A).  The VWPA is clear, however, 
that the Government is not required to show that the 
defendant knew that the contemplated proceeding was federal 
in nature: 
 
In a prosecution for an offense under this 
section, no state of mind need be proved with 
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respect to the circumstance . . . that the official 
proceeding . . . is before a judge or court of the 
United States, a United States magistrate judge, 
a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a 
Federal Government agency . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g)(1).   
 
The parties dispute whether the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Fowler v. United States affects our 
analysis.  131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011).  In Fowler, the Court 
considered the federal nature requirement in § 1512(a)(1)(C), 
which proscribes the murder of a person with the intent to 
“prevent the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense.”  The federal prosecution in 
Fowler arose after Charles Fowler shot a police officer who 
caught him and his associates suiting up to rob a bank.  131 S. 
Ct. at 2048.  It was clear that Fowler had shot the officer with 
the intent to prevent him from speaking to other law 
enforcement officers but that he did not have any specific law 
enforcement officer or set of officers in mind at the time.  To 
satisfy the federal nexus requirement in such a situation, the 
Court held, the Government must demonstrate “a reasonable 
likelihood that, had, e.g., the victim communicated with law 
enforcement officers, at least one relevant communication 
would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer.”  
Id.
 
 at 2052 (emphasis in original).   
Unresolved is whether the “reasonable likelihood” test 
set forth in Fowler applies to prosecutions brought under § 
1512(b)(1) as well.  We decide that question in the negative.  
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Critically, Fowler was a prosecution under § 1512(a)(1)(C), 
which, like § 1512(b)(3), is an investigation-related provision 
aimed at protecting the communication of information to law 
enforcement.  Once again, § 1512(b)(1) is distinct from those 
provisions because it seeks to protect anticipated testimony in 
a particular official proceeding.  See Byrne, 435 F.3d at 24 
(“Unlike [§ 1512] (b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which protect 
particular ‘official proceedings,’ [§ 1512] (b)(3) protects the 
general ability of law enforcement agents to gather 
information relating to federal crimes . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).  The “reasonable likelihood” standard set forth in 
Fowler relates to the probability of a victim communicating 
information to a federal officer, an element required under the 
investigation-related provisions of § 1512 but not the official 
proceeding provisions.  Thus, by its very nature, the 
“reasonable likelihood” standard set forth in Fowler is 
fashioned for the analysis of a materially different offense 
than the one described in § 1512(b)(1).  For the same reasons 
that the holding in Arthur Anderson does not apply to 
§ 1512(b)(3) offenses and the other investigation-related 
offenses in the VWPA, it would be illogical to employ the 
Fowler
 
 holding in prosecutions brought under the VWPA 
provisions that require contemplation of an “official 
proceeding.”   
Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of how we 
could reconcile the “reasonable likelihood” standard from 
Fowler with the holding in Arthur Anderson, which requires 
that the Government prove that the defendant contemplated a 
particular official proceeding.  The Fowler decision addressed 
a situation in which the defendant did not have in 
contemplation a particular group of law enforcement officers.  
Thus, if applied to § 1512(b)(1), the rule set forth in Fowler 
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would directly contradict the Arthur Anderson 
pronouncement.  See Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 708 (“A 
knowingly corrupt persuader cannot be someone who 
persuades others to shred documents under a document 
retention policy when he does not have in contemplation any 
particular official proceeding in which those documents might 
be material.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  It is 
telling that the Fowler opinion does not mention Arthur 
Anderson.  If the Supreme Court intended to overrule Arthur 
Anderson and for all of the VWPA to be governed by Fowler, 
it presumably would have mentioned Arthur Anderson and 
explained why.  See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long 
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (“The Court does not 
normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority 
sub silentio.”).  Instead, the Court crafted a distinct inquiry 
for prosecutions under the VWPA provisions that target 
interference with witness communication to law enforcement 
officers.  This again leads us to the logical conclusion that 
there are at least two lines of jurisprudence developing 
separately under the VWPA:  one for the investigation-related 
provisions, such as § 1512(b)(3) and (a)(1)(C), and one for 
the “official proceeding” provisions, such as § 1512(b)(1) and 
(b)(2).  See Ronda
 
, 455 F.3d at 1288 (observing that the link 
to a federal proceeding in the investigation-related provisions 
is less stringent than the “official proceeding” requirement in 
§ 1512(b)(1) and (2)).  Hence, we hold that a successful 
prosecution under § 1512(b)(1) requires proof, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant contemplated a 
particular, foreseeable proceeding, and that the contemplated 
proceeding constituted an “official proceeding,” as defined by 
§ 1515(a)(1)(A). 
B. 
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Applying the above-stated principles, we conclude that 
the Government’s evidence at trial was insufficient to satisfy 
the “official proceeding” requirement in this case.  It is clear 
from the transcript of the telephone calls that Shavers’s and 
White’s efforts were directed at preventing potential 
witnesses of the speakeasy robbery from testifying at their 
upcoming hearing in Pennsylvania state court.  There is no 
evidence that they contemplated any other proceeding.  In the 
telephone calls at issue, Shavers and White expressly referred 
to specific upcoming state court hearings.  In his prison phone 
call on November 12, 2005, for instance, White discussed the 
speakeasy robbery and who would show up at his upcoming 
court date.  The contemplated court date could only have been 
a hearing in state court, as the federal prosecution was not 
initiated until over a year later.  On November 14, White 
mentioned needing someone to show up for court the 
following day for a “preliminary.”  JA 2106.  In that same 
conversation, Shavers discussed that he would be going to 
court the following day.  On November 18, White stated that 
they would be “back to court the 30th.”  Id. at 2132.  Then, in 
the November 30 conversation, Shavers told the person on the 
other end of the line that they had gone to court and would go 
back in three weeks on January 24.  Likewise, in the January 
9, 2006 conversation, Shavers mentioned that he would be 
going to court for his “preliminary” on January 24.  Id. at 
2159.  Finally, on September 2, White told the caller that “I 
got trial on the 18th, I need you to handle somethin’ for 
me[.]”  Id. at 2202.  All of these conversations demonstrate 
that Shavers and White had in contemplation specific 
hearings in state court, not an “official proceeding” as defined 
by § 1515(a)(1)(A), which, again, requires that the 
contemplated proceeding be federal in nature.  There was no 
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discussion of any other proceeding nor indication that 
Shavers and White intended to prevent the witnesses from 
testifying at a proceeding other than the state court one.5
 
   
The District Court held that, at the time of the alleged 
witness tampering, there was “a sufficient basis for one to be 
put on notice” of the potential for federal prosecution.  Id. at 
1811.  Indeed, there was evidence that Shavers and White 
were aware that they were subject to a federal investigation 
by November 18, 2005 at the latest.  In connection with the 
robbery of a post office on November 7, 2005, the FBI 
initiated an investigation into the overall activities of the 
group of people associated with Ebony Gist, including 
Shavers and White.  Two weeks after the robberies, postal 
inspectors and the Philadelphia Police Department executed a 
search warrant at Gist’s home.  Postal inspectors also began 
reviewing the prison telephone calls of Shavers and White.  
The prison telephone call transcripts reveal that Shavers and 
White learned on November 18, 2005 (at the latest) that 
federal agents were investigating them in connection with the 
post office robbery.  Id. at 2130 (Kenneth Ford: “[T]hey got 
the Feds, SWAT, ramming the houses up in there and all.”  
Shavers: “I heard, man[.]”); id.
                                              
5  Shavers was convicted of violating § 1512(b)(1) for 
telephone conversations occurring on November 14 and 18, 
2005 and January 9, 2006.  White was convicted of violating 
§ 1512(b)(1) for telephone conversations occurring on 
November 12 and 18, 2005, and September 2, 2006.   
 at 2145 (Darryl Harris: “The 
law ran into Eb’s spot last night.”  White: “What?  The Feds 
the … boy.”).  Notwithstanding that evidence, the appellants’ 
knowledge of the post office robbery investigation does not 
support the Government’s case here because the attempts at 
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witness tampering were so obviously directed at specific state 
court proceedings and not some other possible proceeding.  
 
Our discussion in United States v. Bell is instructive.  
113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997).  In Bell, Roberta Ronique Bell 
and several others were accused of murdering Doreen 
Proctor, who was scheduled to testify against Bell’s 
boyfriend, David Tyler, in his state trial on drug offenses.  Id. 
at 1347.  Bell was charged with violating § 1512(a)(1)(A) and 
(C) (relating to the murder of a witness), and § 1512(b)(1), 
(2), and (3).  Although our discussion of the § 1512(b)(1) 
charge was limited, we specified that “§ 1512 clearly would 
not apply if Bell’s sole motivation in killing Proctor was to 
prevent her from testifying at Tyler’s trial, because that state-
court trial does not qualify as an ‘official proceeding.’”  Id.
 
 at 
1349.  That is undoubtedly the case here.  Even though a 
federal proceeding was arguably foreseeable in this case, 
there was no nexus between the possible federal proceeding 
and the appellants’ conduct.  Their conduct was 
unequivocally in contemplation of a state court proceeding.   
The Government asserts that this case is similar to 
United States v. Persico, in which the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that a federal criminal proceeding 
was foreseeable where the defendant had been informed by 
the Government that he was the target of a federal 
investigation.  645 F.3d 85, 108 (2d Cir. 2011).  Persico is 
distinguishable from the case at bar, however.  In Persico, 
there was no pending state criminal proceeding at the time the 
defendant engaged in witness tampering.  Thus, there was no 
dispute that the particular proceeding contemplated by the 
defendant was the imminent federal grand jury proceeding.  
Here, Shavers and White were clearly contemplating their 
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upcoming hearings in Pennsylvania state court, and not any 
federal proceeding, when they sought to tamper with potential 
witnesses.   
 
For that reason, we hold that no rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of a § 1512(b)(1) 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. 
Shively
 
, 927 F.2d 804, 811–12 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the Government had not produced evidence that the defendant 
intended to influence an official proceeding because the 
evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state 
civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance 
agency).  As such, we will vacate Shavers’s convictions on 
Counts Five, Six, and Seven, and White’s convictions on 
Counts Four, Six, and Eight. 
IV. The Identification Evidence 
 
The appellants challenge the admission of a number of 
eyewitness identifications on due process grounds, arguing 
that they were the result of impermissibly suggestive 
procedures and were unreliable.  After a suppression hearing, 
the District Court summarily held that the identification 
procedures used by the police were not unduly suggestive and 
the identifications were, therefore, admissible.  We find no 
basis for reversal with respect to the identification evidence. 
 
A. 
 
We review the District Court’s ruling on the admission 
of identification testimony for an abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2006).  In 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we examine the 
32 
 
District Court’s factual findings for clear error and review its 
legal determinations under a plenary standard.  Id.
 
   
To determine whether an out-of-court identification 
procedure violated due process, we conduct a two-step 
inquiry.  First, we assess whether the police used an 
identification procedure that was unnecessarily suggestive.  
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012).  In 
answering the question of whether a show-up identification 
was impermissibly suggestive, “each case must be considered 
on its own facts.”  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Even where the police employed 
an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, however, the 
identification testimony is not automatically excluded.  Perry, 
132 S. Ct. at 724.  Instead, as a second step, we engage in a 
case-by-case analysis of whether the procedure gave rise to 
such a “substantial likelihood of misidentification” that 
admitting the identification would be a denial of due process.  
Id.  If so, the identification evidence must be excluded.  If, on 
the other hand, “the indicia of reliability are strong enough to 
outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged 
suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence 
ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately 
determine its worth.”  Id. at 720.  Recently, in Perry v. New 
Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court directed that 
courts should not reach the reliability inquiry unless the 
identification resulted from a situation created by improper 
police conduct.  Id.
 
 at 728.   
B. 
 
White and Shavers first protest the admission of 
identifications made by eyewitnesses Brian Anderson and 
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Alberto Vasquez at the scene of the robbery.  They argue that 
the out-of-court “show-up” witness identifications were 
impermissibly suggestive because the witnesses made the 
identifications while Shavers and White were handcuffed in 
police vehicles at the scene of the robbery and bystanders 
were commenting on the men in the vehicles.  The appellants 
maintain that the on-scene identifications were unnecessary 
because the police could have just as easily conducted a 
lineup at the police station, and that they were unreliable 
because neither witness had an opportunity to observe all of 
the perpetrators’ facial features during the robbery.   
 
 We have recognized that a show-up identification 
procedure of the sort employed here “is inherently suggestive 
because, by its very nature, it suggests that the police think 
they have caught the perpetrator of the crime.”  Brownlee, 
454 F.3d at 138; see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 
(1967), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314 (1987) (“The practice of showing suspects 
singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as 
part of a line-up, has been widely condemned.”).  
Nonetheless, show-up identifications may be necessary when 
there is an “imperative” need for an immediate identification.  
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.  For instance, exigency justified a 
show-up identification without the presence of counsel in 
Stovall v. Denno because a key witness was critically injured 
in the hospital and a show-up identification was “the only 
feasible procedure.”  Id.
 
   
In United States v. Brownlee, we held that show-up 
identifications by a number of eyewitnesses in that case were 
unduly suggestive.  454 F.3d at 138.  The police conducted 
the identifications while the defendant, who was suspected of 
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car-jacking, was handcuffed in the police cruiser at the scene 
where the stolen car had crashed.  The entire scene gave the 
impression that the police had apprehended the defendant in 
the stolen car.  Exacerbating the suggestiveness were the facts 
that the defendant was the only suspect shown, the four 
witnesses made identifications while exposed to each others’ 
influence, and there was no reason why the defendant could 
not have been taken to the police station for a less suggestive 
line-up or photo array.  Id.
 
   
We conclude that the show-up identifications in this 
case were unnecessarily suggestive.  Like in Brownlee, the 
identifications took place while Shavers and White were 
handcuffed in patrol cars at the scene of the crime and they 
were the only suspects shown to the witnesses.  Moreover, as 
in Brownlee, there was a risk here that the witnesses 
influenced each other.  In particular, when the officers pulled 
up to the robbery scene with the appellants in police vehicles, 
the eyewitnesses waiting outside of the house approached the 
patrol car and police van, started pointing at Shavers and 
White and said “that’s the guys that just left out of there.”  JA 
556.  Anderson testified that he pointed at the suspects to 
identify them and he could hear the other witnesses 
discussing and identifying the suspects.  Id.
 
 at 555.   
The Government proffered no reason why the 
appellants and witnesses were not taken to the police station 
for a less suggestive line-up or photo array, or at least down 
the street for a less suggestive show-up identification.  We 
acknowledge that some exigency existed here because, due to 
witness reports that the perpetrators were carrying firearms, it 
was vital to know immediately whether the correct people had 
been apprehended.  See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
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377, 384–85 (1968) (holding that a show-up identification 
procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive because “[a] 
serious felony had been committed[,]  [t]he perpetrators were 
still at large[,] [and it] was essential for the FBI agents swiftly 
to determine whether they were on the right track . . . .”).  It 
was also important to conduct the identifications while the 
witnesses’ memories were still fresh.  See United States v. 
Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We have also 
recognized that immediate show-ups can serve other 
important interests.  For example, show-ups allow 
identification before the suspect has altered his appearance 
and while the witness’ memory is fresh, and permit the quick 
release of innocent persons.” (quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Watson
 
, 76 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a show-up identification was not impermissibly 
suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful 
conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong 
person).  Despite the urgency at hand, however, the 
suggestiveness of the identification procedure could have 
been easily minimized if the officers had parked down the 
street and brought each eyewitness separately to make an 
identification.   
Although the identifications under these circumstances 
were unnecessarily suggestive, their presentation to the jury 
was still appropriate because the circumstances did not create 
a substantial risk of misidentification.  In making that 
assessment, we take into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196.  In Neil v. Biggers, 
the Supreme Court set forth various factors that aid courts in 
determining whether an identification was reliable despite a 
suggestive procedure:  (1) “the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the crime,” (2)  “the witness’ 
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degree of attention,” (3) “the accuracy of the witness’ prior 
description of the criminal,” (4)  “the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,” and (5) 
“the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”  
Id. at 199–200.  In Biggers, the Court held that a show-up 
identification was reliable despite a suggestive procedure 
because the victim spent a lot of time in close proximity with 
her assailant, her description to police was “more than 
ordinarily thorough,” she had “no doubt” that the defendant 
was the assailant, and she had been presented with a number 
of previous show-up identification inquiries without making 
an identification.  Id. at 200–01.  To warrant the exclusion of 
evidence, the Biggers factors must indicate a substantial risk 
of misidentification.  The existence of “potential 
unreliability” alone is not enough to compel exclusion of an 
identification because there are “other safeguards built into 
our adversary system” that minimize the risk that a jury will 
place “undue weight on eyewitness testimony of questionable 
reliability.”  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.  Those safeguards 
include cross-examination, the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, eyewitness-specific jury instructions, the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, and the state and federal rules of 
evidence.  Id.
 
 at 728–29.   
In Brownlee, we held that the eyewitness 
identifications were reliable despite law enforcement’s use of 
an impermissibly suggestive procedure.  We noted that some 
facts suggested a risk of misidentification:  (1) the 
abbreviated duration of the car-jacking — only 30 seconds; 
(2) the victim’s testimony that she was predominantly 
focused on the weapon, not the perpetrator, during the car-
jacking; (3) the victim’s mistaken account to the police that 
the perpetrator was a child wearing shorts, when he was 
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actually a 30 year-old wearing pants; and (4) the generality of 
the witnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator.  Brownlee, 454 
F.3d at 140.  Despite those concerns, we concluded that the 
identifications were properly admitted because the witnesses 
were able to observe the perpetrator at close range, in broad 
daylight, and for sufficient time; their testimony revealed a 
substantial degree of attention during the crime; their 
descriptions were fairly accurate; their degree of certainty 
was absolute; and only 25 minutes had elapsed between the 
crime and the eyewitness identifications.  Id.  We decided that 
the facts undermining the reliability of the identifications — 
“[t]he generality of the witnesses’ descriptions of the suspect, 
the relatively short period of time they saw him, and the other 
shortcomings pertaining to their identifications” — went 
“more to the weight of the evidence than the reliability of 
their identifications, and thus were issues for the jury.”  
 
Id. 
Biggers and Brownlee drive our conclusion that 
Vasquez’s and Anderson’s identifications did not present a 
substantial risk of misidentification.  With respect to the first 
Biggers factor, Anderson and Vasquez both had the 
opportunity, albeit brief, to view the appellants’ clothing and 
faces.  On the morning of November 8, 2005, Anderson 
witnessed three armed gunmen wearing hooded sweatshirts 
enter Jeanette’s residence and order everyone down on the 
ground.  Anderson testified about Shavers that he could see 
“part of his face,” including his nose, mustache, and the top 
of his forehead.  JA 878.  Of the other appellants, he testified:  
“[T]he other one I could see his face. . . .  The other one, he 
had his hood like real loose.  I could see his whole face.”  Id.  
After the robbery, he recognized the men in the police cars 
“[b]ecause of their size and their faces.  They still had the 
black hoodies on.”  Id. at 882.   
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Similarly, Vasquez testified that the three perpetrators 
wore hooded sweatshirts that did not show their faces and he 
could see “only like their eyes and maybe their foreheads.”  
Id. at 966.  Nevertheless, he was able to identify the man with 
the shotgun, Shavers, because he unzipped his hooded 
sweatshirt.  Id. at 966–67.  He also testified that he was able 
to see White’s face.  Id. at 975.  When asked to identify the 
men in the police cars after the robbery, Vasquez recognized 
them “based on the appearance of their faces and their clothes 
that they were wearing . . . .  They were similar, and facial 
structures, they had the same faces that I had seen when they 
took their hoods off, and they were wearing the same clothing 
and hoodies at the time.”  Id.
 
 at 978–79.   
Although the witnesses were only able to view the 
perpetrators for a short time and could only see parts of their 
faces, they saw them at close range and were able to give an 
accurate general description including what the perpetrators 
looked like and what they were wearing.  As we held in 
Brownlee, the short amount of time in which the witnesses 
were able to observe the perpetrators and the generality of 
their descriptions were facts for the jury to consider rather 
than ones that precluded admission of the identifications.  454 
F.3d at 140.  Shavers notes that Vasquez inaccurately testified 
about his weight, stating that he weighed 150 pounds, when 
200 pounds was more accurate.  An inconsistency such as 
this, however, is for the jury to consider when they decide 
how to weigh an identification.  See id.
 
   
The second Biggers factor also supports the reliability 
of the eyewitness identifications.  The witnesses’ testimony 
illustrates that they were paying close attention to the 
perpetrators.  For instance, they knew the kinds of firearms 
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the perpetrators carried:  “Mr. Lewis had a black 9-millimeter 
or .45 caliber” and “[t]he other gentleman . . . had a nickel-
plated pistol.”  JA 969.  The possibility that Anderson and 
Vasquez were more focused on the firearms than on the 
perpetrators’ faces was another question for the jury, not a 
reason to surmise that there was a substantial risk of a 
misidentification as a matter of law.  See Brownlee
 
, 454 F.3d 
at 140.   
The third Biggers factor has no bearing on this case 
because Vasquez and Anderson gave no description of the 
perpetrators prior to their on-the-scene identifications.  The 
fourth Biggers factor counsels that there was little risk of 
misidentification here because, like the witnesses in 
Brownlee
 
, both Anderson and Vasquez testified that they 
were certain that they had identified the correct men.  
Furthermore, Vasquez and Anderson both repeatedly 
corroborated their initial identifications.  Later on the day of 
the robbery, Vasquez recognized White at the prison.  Two 
years after the robbery, Anderson identified Shavers and 
White when shown separate pictures.  Four years after the 
robbery, Anderson was placed in the same holding cell as 
Lewis, Shavers, and White where he recognized all three as 
involved in the robbery.  And, at trial, Vasquez and Anderson 
identified all three appellants.  
Finally, the police presented Vasquez and Anderson 
with the suspects within minutes of the robbery.  There is an 
inherent reliability to an identification made immediately 
following the witness’s confrontation with the suspect 
because the perpetrator’s appearance is fresh in the witness’s 
mind.  We articulated that principle in United States v. 
Gaines, when we held that an on-the-scene show-up 
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identification made immediately following a bank robbery 
was justified by, inter alia, the inherent reliability of an 
immediate identification.  450 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1971).  
Similarly, in United States v. Hawkins
 
, another robbery case, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a show-
up identification was reliable, in part, because it was 
conducted within an hour of the crime.  499 F.3d 703, 710 
(7th Cir. 2007).   
Scrutiny of the Biggers
 
 factors as applied to the facts 
of this case convinces us that the show-up identifications did 
not present a substantial likelihood of misidentification.  
Thus, we hold that the District Court properly permitted the 
jury to hear testimony about the show-up identifications and 
the related in-court identifications. 
C. 
 
Lewis challenges identifications made by Vasquez and 
Anderson as well.  First, he objects to the admission of 
Vasquez’s identification of him on June 25, 2008 in an eight-
person photo array.  In viewing the photo array, Vasquez 
initially stated that he could not decide whether the third 
perpetrator was Lewis or the person in the fourth photo, a 
filler.  Nevertheless, he later identified Lewis in court at the 
pretrial hearing and testified that he was 100% sure that the 
third perpetrator was Lewis after he studied the pictures in the 
photo array more closely.  Lewis maintains that the photo 
array and in-court identifications by Vasquez should have 
been suppressed because they were unreliable.   
 
Vasquez’s position is unpersuasive.  As discussed 
above, the reliability prong of the due process analysis is only 
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reached if the court determines that law enforcement used an 
impermissibly suggestive procedure.  See Perry
 
, 132 S. Ct. at 
724 (“[D]ue process concerns arise only when law 
enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is 
both suggestive and unnecessary.”).  Because Lewis has 
proffered no reason why the photo array was unnecessarily 
suggestive, there is no basis for finding a due process 
violation occurred here and we do not reach the reliability 
inquiry.   
D. 
 
Next, Lewis asserts that Anderson’s in-court 
identification of him was the result of an impermissibly 
suggestive encounter in which Anderson (who was 
incarcerated) was placed in a United States Marshal’s Service 
holding cell with the three appellants three months before 
trial.6
                                              
6  White states in his brief that he joins Lewis’s 
argument with respect to Anderson’s identification.  Lewis’s 
brief provides no argument on White’s behalf, however.  
Assessing identification evidence is a predominantly fact-
based inquiry and White provides no factual support or 
argument illustrating why Anderson’s identification of him 
was admitted in violation of due process.  White has, 
therefore, inadequately presented the issue on appeal,  See 
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue is waived unless a party raises it 
in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing 
reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before 
this court.”).   
  On the day the encounter took place, June 14, 2009, a 
suppression hearing had been scheduled to occur.  When the 
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hearing was cancelled, the Government decided to conduct a 
preparatory session with Anderson instead and did not cancel 
his order of transport from prison to federal court.  For an 
unknown reason, however, the order to transport the 
appellants to the courthouse was not cancelled and Anderson 
was inadvertently placed in a holding cell with them.  
Anderson first recognized Lewis by his face and voice when 
they were transported from the prison block in an elevator 
together with two other prisoners (not Shavers and White).  
When Anderson, Lewis, Shavers, and White were later placed 
in a holding cell together, Anderson recognized all three 
appellants as the perpetrators of the robbery.  He then 
identified them at the pretrial hearing and at trial.  Lewis 
moved to suppress Anderson’s in-court identification of him 
on the grounds that Anderson had failed to identify Lewis 
previously but then recognized him as involved in the robbery 
after encountering him in the holding cell with the other 
appellants. 
 
 Due to the holding cell mishap, Anderson’s in-court 
identification of Lewis is certainly suspect.  In United States 
v. Emanuele, we dealt with a somewhat analogous incident.  
51 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1995).  In that case, two witnesses were 
sitting outside of the courtroom during trial when they 
observed the defendant walking down the corridor in 
handcuffs with a Deputy United States Marshal on either side 
of him.  Id. at 1129–30.  We declared that the situation was 
impermissibly suggestive.  Id. at 1130.  In light of Emanuele, 
the suggestive nature of the situation in this case is evident.  
Two years after the robbery, Anderson could not identify 
Lewis in a photo array.  When Anderson saw Lewis in the 
prison elevator while exiting the prison on a day he knew he 
was going to testify about the speakeasy robbery, it was 
43 
 
natural for him to suspect that Lewis was the third person 
involved in the robbery.  That suspicion was likely confirmed 
when he and Lewis were then placed in a holding cell with 
Shavers and White, whom Anderson had already identified.  
Placing Lewis in an elevator and then a holding cell with a 
key witness could have and should have been avoided.  It is 
equivalent to allowing a witness to observe a defendant in 
shackles outside the courtroom.   
 
The Government asserts that placing the four men 
together was inadvertent.  The lack of an improper motive is 
immaterial, however, because the encounter was still the 
result of improper conduct on the part of law enforcement.  
See id. (“We conclude that the confrontation was caused by 
the government, albeit inadvertently . . . .”).  Under Perry, the 
police must take an active role in creating the suggestive 
situation before the reliability inquiry is reached.  That 
prerequisite can be gleaned from the Court’s use of the active 
verbs “arrange,” “employ,” “use,” and others throughout the 
opinion.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724 (“[D]ue process 
concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an 
identification procedure that is both suggestive and 
unnecessary.”); id. at 726 (“The Court adopted a judicial 
screen for reliability as a course preferable to a per se rule 
requiring exclusion of identification evidence whenever law 
enforcement officers employ an improper procedure.”); id. 
(“[T]he Court has linked the due process check . . . only to 
improper police arrangement of the circumstances 
surrounding an identification.”); id. at 726–27 (“[T]he risk of 
police rigging was the very danger to which the Court 
responded in Wade when it recognized a defendant’s right to 
counsel at postindictment, police-organized identification 
procedures.”); id. at 727 (“To illustrate the improper 
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suggestion it was concerned about, the Court pointed to 
police-designed lineups . . . .”).  The Court also justified its 
rule on the basis that the deterrence rationale justifying the 
exclusion of an identification at trial “is inapposite in cases, 
like Perry’s, in which the police engaged in no improper 
conduct.”  Id. at 726.  Nevertheless, the Court explicitly 
denied that it was creating a mens rea requirement for the 
police conduct and maintained that “what triggers due process 
concerns is police use of an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure, whether or not they intended the 
arranged procedure to be suggestive.”  Id. at 721 n.1.  Thus, 
we do not interpret Perry
 
 as requiring that the improper police 
conduct be intentionally aimed at creating a suggestive 
situation. 
This case is distinguishable from Perry, in which the 
witness had “spontaneously” walked to the window of her 
apartment building and pointed to Perry “without any 
inducement from the police.”  Id.
 
 at 722.  Here, the United 
States Marshal actively placed the appellants and Anderson 
together.  Either the United States Marshal or the Bureau of 
Prisons was responsible for ensuring that the three appellants 
would not be housed with a critical witness.  The failure of 
either government entity to do so resulted in an impermissibly 
suggestive situation. 
We arrive at the question of whether Anderson’s 
identification of Lewis was bolstered by sufficient indicia of 
reliability despite the unduly suggestive confrontation in the 
holding cell.  Anderson had only a short time to view the 
perpetrators’ faces at the time of the robbery — maybe 20 
seconds.  Critically, Anderson testified that Lewis did not 
have his face covered during the robbery.  Anderson appears 
45 
 
to have been paying  attention because he was able to report 
accurately that Lewis was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt 
and carrying a black automatic handgun.   
 
The strength of Anderson’s identification falters upon 
consideration of the third Biggers factor, the accuracy of his 
prior description of the suspect.  Anderson previously 
described Lewis as a “black male, approximately 30, 6-feet-3, 
approximately 225 pounds.”  JA 563.  His description of 
Lewis at trial was somewhat different — a light-skinned male 
with a beard.  Id. at 533–35, 564.  Anderson also told police 
that he had seen the third perpetrator after the robbery on 
Germantown Avenue, then later recanted, saying he was 
mistaken.  Id.
 
 at 573–75.  The inconsistencies evident in 
Anderson’s testimony call into question the reliability of his 
identification of Lewis.   
The fourth Biggers factor also warns of a risk of 
misidentification because four years passed between the 
robbery and Anderson’s identification of Lewis in the holding 
cell.  In the meantime, Anderson failed to identify Lewis in a 
photo array two years after the robbery.  Emanuele is once 
again instructive.  51 F.3d at 1129–30.  In Emanuele, like 
here, the witnesses benefited from an unobstructed view of 
the perpetrators during the bank robbery.  The second prong 
of the identification due process analysis, reliability, turned 
on whether the witnesses had previously made an accurate 
identification of the defendant and, therefore, had 
independent grounds for making identifications at trial.  Id. at 
1131.  Despite the witnesses’ adequate opportunity to view 
the perpetrators during the crime, the first witness’s failure to 
identify the defendant in a photo array prior to the suggestive 
encounter undermined the reliability of her in-court 
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identification and revealed a substantial risk of 
misidentification.  Id.  The in-court identification of the other 
witness, however, was permissible because she had 
previously identified the defendant in a photo array.  Id.
 
  
Anderson’s previous failure to identify Lewis before seeing 
him with the other appellants in the holding cell before trial 
leads us to conclude that the risk of misidentification was 
substantial.  For that reason, Anderson’s identification of 
Lewis should not have been admitted at trial. 
 We conclude, nonetheless, that the admission of 
Anderson’s identification was harmless error.  Under the 
harmless error test for constitutional violations articulated in 
Chapman v. California, the Government must prove “beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  
“[T]he relevant question under Chapman is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
error.”  Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 337 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quotation marks omitted).  In deciding whether to 
exercise the Court’s discretion to consider an error to be 
harmless, “the controlling considerations are the length and 
complexity of the record, whether the harmlessness of the 
error or errors found is certain or debatable, and whether a 
reversal will result in protracted, costly, and ultimately futile 
proceedings in the district court.”  United States v. 
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotation 
marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by United States 
v. Fiorelli
 
, 133 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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In light of the overwhelming evidence against Lewis in 
this case, we conclude that the error was harmless and does 
not compel reversal.  Another eyewitness, Vasquez, was 
absolutely certain about his identification of Lewis as the 
third robber.  Furthermore, Sheronda Gaskin testified that 
Lewis was with Shavers and White at Ebony Gist’s house the 
night before the robbery when a fourth man told them of a 
house in Jeanette’s neighborhood that had a lot of money.  JA 
1430, 1441.  Gaskin observed the three appellants “get 
prepared to rob the house” by donning hooded sweatshirts 
and masks, and “loading up their guns.”  Id. at 1431.  The 
following morning, Lewis arrived at Gist’s home with bruises 
and “was telling everybody how he got away.”  Id. at 1435.  
He explained to Gaskin that “they had tried to rob the house” 
and that “he went out through the back.”  Id. at 1436.  In a 
telephone conversation on November 18, 2005, White warned 
Lewis that the authorities were searching for him and to 
“keep a low profile.”  Id. at 2136.  Later in the conversation, 
Lewis and Shavers discussed how Lewis had escaped after 
the robbery.  Id.
 
 at 2139.  We are convinced that there was 
ample evidence in the record of Lewis’s culpability such that 
the erroneous admission of Anderson’s identification of 
Lewis was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.   
E. 
 
Finally, White appeals the denial of his motion to 
suppress Rickey’s identification of him at the police station, 
in a lineup, and in court on the basis that Rickey did not have 
sufficient opportunity to see White’s face at the speakeasy.  
White’s challenge to Rickey’s identification is unsuccessful 
because he does not explain why any of the procedures used 
by law enforcement were unnecessarily suggestive.  In 
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addition, Rickey’s identification at the police station is 
unchallengeable under Perry because he identified White on 
his own accord, without prompting by the police.  See
 
 132 S. 
Ct. at 728.  For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting Rickey’s identifications of White. 
V. Prison Telephone Conversations 
 
Lewis challenges the District Court’s denial of his 
pretrial motion to suppress a telephone conversation recorded 
at the prison on November 15, 2005 between Lewis, who was 
not imprisoned at the time, White, and others.  Lewis argues 
that recording the call violated his Fourth Amendment right to 
be free of unreasonable searches because he was unaware that 
the call would be recorded and, thus, he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the call.   
 
We review the District Court’s decision to admit 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Serafini, 
233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  The Fourth 
Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
Fourth Amendment protections are not triggered unless the 
state monitors an area in which the defendant has a 
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986).  
Determining whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is 
justifiable under the Fourth Amendment involves two 
inquiries:  “(1) whether the individual demonstrated an actual 
or subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the 
search or seizure; and (2) whether this expectation of privacy 
is objectively justifiable under the circumstances.”  Free 
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Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen.
 
, 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
Under the specific circumstances presented in this 
case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with 
White.  Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when 
White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and 
White mail there.  Furthermore, Lewis was previously 
incarcerated at the same prison.  Thus, he would have 
received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were 
recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the 
common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be 
monitored and recorded.  In these circumstances, Lewis 
should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls 
were monitored and recorded.  See United States v. Sababu, 
891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a non-
prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when 
speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because, as a frequent 
visitor to the prison, she was “well aware of the strict security 
measures in place” and that the Code of Federal Regulations 
puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to 
monitor prisoners’ telephone calls); United States v. Harrison, 
986 F. Supp. 280, 281–82 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (observing that the 
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy because it 
was clear from the content of the telephone calls and his 
guarded language that he knew he was speaking with a 
prisoner and that the calls would be monitored).  We hold, 
therefore, that Lewis’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
admission of the telephone call transcript is unavailing.7
                                              
7  The Government devotes much of its brief to 
arguing that the recording of Lewis’s conversation was not a 
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VI. The Post Office Robbery Evidence 
 
All three appellants assert that the District Court erred 
in permitting the Government to introduce evidence that they 
were involved in the uncharged armed robbery of a post 
office.  Although the Government had originally moved to 
admit more details about the post office robbery investigation, 
the evidence elicited at trial was essentially limited to the 
following facts.  Approximately twelve hours prior to the 
speakeasy robbery, at 6:30 p.m. on November 7, 2005, a post 
office was robbed in West Philadelphia.  Postal Inspector 
Kathleen Brady testified that on November 17, 2005, postal 
inspectors executed a search warrant of Gist’s house based on 
information that the post office robbery had been committed 
by people staying there.  Investigators also began inquiries 
                                                                                                     
violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, which prohibits the interception of “any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication,” including telephone 
conversations.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).  We need not delve into 
that topic, however, because Lewis does not claim a violation 
of that Act. 
 
White also states in his brief, without argument, that he 
joins Lewis’s challenge to the prison telephone call.  White’s 
challenge is unconvincing, however, as he engaged in other 
calls from the prison prior to the November 15 call during 
which he was specifically warned that prison telephone calls 
might be monitored and recorded.  JA 2114.  For the reasons 
stated above, prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when speaking on a prison telephone, especially 
where a warning has been given.  
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into the people who spent time at Gist’s house, including 
Lewis, Shavers, and White.  The search produced a cellular 
phone belonging to a customer from the speakeasy.  Postal 
inspectors also subpoenaed Shavers’s and White’s recorded 
prison telephone calls and visitor logs in connection with the 
investigation.8
 
  The Government also offered Gist’s testimony 
that, on the night of the post office robbery, four individuals 
ran into her house and hid in her back room from a helicopter 
that was scanning the area.  The next morning, four men, 
including Lewis, were in her house and one of the men (not 
Lewis) was counting money.  Gist testified that a neighbor 
stopped by later and told “Snoop” (Kenneth Ford) that he was 
a suspect in the post office robbery.   
We review the District Court’s decision to admit 
evidence for abuse of discretion, meaning that “we must 
uphold the District Court unless its ruling was arbitrary or 
irrational.”  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239, 251–
52 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) limits the admission of evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts “to prove a person’s character in order 
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”  Such evidence “may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  Id.
                                              
8  White claims that the transcripts of prison telephone 
calls that were admitted into evidence in this case implicated 
the three appellants in the post office robbery.  There is no 
mention of the post office robbery in those transcripts, 
however.   
  The “threshold 
inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts 
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evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is 
probative of a material issue other than character.”  
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988).  We 
have long considered Rule 404(b) to be inclusionary such that 
“evidence of other wrongful acts was admissible so long as it 
was not introduced solely to prove criminal propensity.”  
Green
 
, 617 F.3d at 244. 
For similar act evidence to come in under Rule 404(b), 
there must be “(1) a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) relevance 
under Rule 402; (3) a weighing of the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) 
a limiting instruction concerning the purpose for which the 
evidence may be used.”  United States v. Butch
 
, 256 F.3d 
171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).  Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”  Fed. R. Evid. 401.  
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, we must also 
consider whether the probative value of the evidence is 
“substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”   
Applying this framework, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing in the limited 
evidence concerning the post office robbery.  First, evidence 
of the ongoing investigation into the post office robbery was 
relevant and was offered for proper evidentiary purposes.  
Inspector Brady’s testimony about the post office robbery 
investigation was critical to the witness tampering allegations 
because the Government was attempting to prove that 
Shavers and White were being investigated by federal 
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authorities and that a federal criminal proceeding was 
foreseeable.9  Under Rule 404(b), it is permissible to admit 
evidence that shows the defendant’s knowledge of a key fact.  
Inspector Brady’s testimony was also necessary to admit 
another critical piece of evidence against Lewis — the 
presence of both Lewis and a speakeasy customer’s cell 
phone at Gist’s residence the day after the speakeasy robbery.  
Finally, the evidence explained the references to a federal 
investigation in the prison telephone calls and why Shavers, 
White, and Lewis were being investigated.  Providing 
background information of that sort is a proper evidentiary 
purpose.  See Green
 
, 617 F.3d at 250 (“Here, evidence of 
Green’s threat was admissible as background information 
which completed the story of the crime.  It explained why 
Green was under investigation, why Stahl agreed to serve as 
an informant, and the references to A.G. in their 
conversations.”). 
Second, to the extent that the jury could have gleaned 
any inference that the appellants were involved in the post 
office robbery due to their association with Gist, we agree 
with the District Court that the probative value of the disputed 
evidence was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of . 
. . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  The evidence did 
not speak to the appellants’ character because there was no 
proof that the appellants had committed the post office 
                                              
9  The fact that we ultimately hold that the Government 
did not meet its burden on the witness tampering count does 
not change our view that the admission of this evidence at 
trial had a proper purpose.  
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robbery.  Proof that they were being investigated alone is 
substantially less prejudicial than evidence of the commission 
of a crime.  The possible prejudicial effect of the post office 
robbery evidence, therefore, did not substantially outweigh its 
probative value.  See United States v. Jones
 
, 566 F.3d 353, 
365 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that evidence of violent crimes 
and other illegal activities of defendant’s gang was not unduly 
prejudicial because defendant “was not directly implicated” 
and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that 
the defendant was charged with).   
The appellants claim that the disputed evidence here is 
analogous to the erroneously admitted evidence in United 
States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997). In that case, 
we held that evidence that the defendant had committed an 
uncharged murder should not have been presented to the jury 
because it was extremely prejudicial and irrelevant.  Id. at 
317–18.  The prejudicial nature of the evidence in this case, 
where there is merely the possibility that the appellants or 
their associates were involved in another crime, is far less 
than in Murray, which involved evidence that the defendant 
had actually committed another murder.  Moreover, unlike 
the evidence in Murray
 
, the evidence in this case was relevant 
and was offered for a proper evidentiary purpose. 
Finally, the District Court’s failure to give a limiting 
instruction addressing this evidence was not reversible error 
because there is no indication in the record that defense 
counsel requested one.  See Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 526 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the 
district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction addressing 
Rule 404(b) evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise 
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the issue on appeal); United States v. Multi-Mgmt., Inc., 743 
F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1984) (“It is well-settled that where 
no limiting instruction is requested concerning evidence of 
other criminal acts, the failure of the trial court to give such 
an instruction sua sponte
 
 is not reversible error.”).  Even if 
there had been such a request, however, the lack of a limiting 
instruction would be harmless error, given the extent to which 
the probative value of the disputed evidence outweighs its 
negligible prejudicial effect.  We will, therefore, affirm the 
District Court’s admission of the post office robbery 
evidence. 
VII. Statement by Witness Sheronda Gaskin 
 
The three appellants next challenge the District Court’s 
refusal to declare a mistrial after an outburst by Government 
witness Sheronda Gaskin.  On redirect, Gaskin declared: 
 
Having me testify right here, like I’m afraid for 
my life.  By me saying what I said in this 
courtroom today, there’s no way possible I can 
stay in Philadelphia.  Like that’s a known fact 
right there.  That’s a given, like.  For a fact, I 
know G Bucks [Shavers] is a killer. 
 
JA 1514.  After the outburst, the District Court excused the 
jury for lunch.  When they returned, the Court issued a 
cautionary jury instruction, stating: 
 
I am directing, ladies and gentlemen, that you 
are to disregard the answer and the question 
posed to the witness prior to your recess.  You 
are not to consider the response or the question 
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in any form or way as it relates to any one of 
these three defendants.  It has no relationship to 
anything that is charged in this superseding 
indictment in this case . . . .  I further instruct 
you that no one can mention that testimony or 
that question during any portion or course of the 
deliberations in this case. 
 
Id. at 1524–25.  The Court also reiterated in its jury 
instruction at the end of the trial that the jury must disregard 
evidence that had been stricken by the Court.  Id. at 1981.  
Shavers moved for a mistrial, which the Court denied 
because, although the “prejudice [was] significant,” it did not 
deprive Shavers of the right to a fair trial in consideration of 
the totality of the evidence.  Id.
  
 at 1518, 1521–22, 2040–41.  
We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial based 
on the admission of allegedly prejudicial evidence for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 207 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  We are concerned with whether the statement 
was so prejudicial that the appellants were deprived of the 
fundamental right to a fair trial.  United States v. Xavier, 2 
F.3d 1281, 1285 (3d Cir. 1993).  Three factors guide our 
analysis of Gaskin’s inappropriate outburst:  “(1) whether 
[the] remarks were pronounced and persistent, creating a 
likelihood they would mislead and prejudice the jury; (2) the 
strength of the other evidence; and (3) curative action taken 
by the district court.”  Lore
 
, 430 F.3d at 207.   
In Lore, a prosecution for embezzlement, a witness 
blurted out, “You have to ask [one of the defendants].  She 
handled the checkbook.”  Id. at 207.  We held that a curative 
instruction was sufficient because the statement was dwarfed 
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by the witness’s five days of testimony, and thus was not 
pronounced or persistent, and there was strong evidence of 
the defendant’s culpability.  Id.  Similarly, in United States v. 
Riley, a witness twice mentioned that he had met the 
defendant in a work release program, which impermissibly 
informed the jury that the defendant had been convicted of a 
previous crime.  621 F.3d 312, 336 (3d Cir. 2010).  We held 
that the remarks were not pronounced or persistent because 
they were two remarks in the course of three days of 
testimony in a five-week trial.  Id.  Moreover, there was 
significant evidence of guilt such that “there [was] no 
question that the jury did not solely rely upon the fact that 
[defendant] was on work release.”  Id. at 337.  Finally, the 
Court gave a curative instruction in the jury instructions at the 
end of the trial.  
 
Id. 
The context of the remarks and the other Lore factors 
drive the analysis, rather than the number of prejudicial 
remarks.  We have declared a mistrial on the basis of solitary 
prejudicial remarks.  In United States v. Carney, the 
defendant’s coconspirator, John Blandford, testified that the 
defendant, who was on trial for a fraud-related conspiracy, 
had “tried to kill myself and my two children.”  461 F.2d 465, 
466 (3d Cir. 1972).  The District Court ordered the testimony 
stricken and instructed the jury not to consider the question or 
answer.  We vacated the conviction, holding that the only 
remedy was a mistrial because the prejudice was “obvious” 
and Blandford’s testimony was essential to the Government’s 
case.  Id. at 466–68.  Other factors relevant to our 
determination were the lack of overwhelming evidence of 
guilt, the statement’s lack of impeachment value or relevance, 
the fact that the prosecutor elicited the testimony by asking an 
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“obviously risky question” on direct examination, and the 
defendant’s prompt motion for a mistrial.  Id.
 
 at 468.   
In United States v. Gray, the defendant, who was 
charged with bank robbery, testified and volunteered that he 
had previously been “locked up waiting trial on my wife’s 
death” and that his “wife was killed.”  468 F.2d 257, 258 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (en banc).  In response, the prosecutor asked: “You 
killed her, didn’t you?”  Id. at 259.  The District Court 
sustained the defense’s objection to the question and 
instructed the jury to ignore the testimony and strike it from 
their minds.  Id.  We held that a mistrial should have been 
granted because the prosecutor’s question was “grievous plain 
error” and “[n]o cautionary instruction could purge the jury’s 
mind and memory of the devastating impact of the question.”  
Id.
 
  
Gaskin’s statement, although inappropriate, does not 
rise to the level that would compel a mistrial.  Her statement, 
a single, isolated comment in the course of a six-day trial, was 
not as “pronounced and persistent” as the remarks in Carney 
and Gray.  The statements in Carney and Gray were much 
more specific than in this case because they identified specific 
incidents and victims.  Additionally, Gaskin’s testimony had 
already been undermined because she admitted to having 
committed perjury before the grand jury.  Thus, the first Lore
 
 
factor does not persuade us that a mistrial was appropriate. 
The second Lore factor also counsels against declaring 
a mistrial.  There was considerable evidence of Shavers’s 
culpability including, inter alia, his arrest within minutes and 
blocks of the robbery, which took place at 5:30 a.m., an 
unusual hour to be running down the street; Vasquez’s and 
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Anderson’s identifications of Shavers immediately following 
the robbery and later in court; Shavers’s possession upon 
arrest of shotgun shells combined with witnesses’ testimony 
that one of the men at the robbery was carrying a shotgun; 
Gaskin’s testimony that Shavers and White were discussing a 
house with lots of money the night before the robbery and 
then left Gist’s house shortly before the robbery armed with 
firearms; and the prison telephone calls in which Shavers 
discussed being present at Jeanette’s during the robbery.  The 
substantial evidence of Shavers’s guilt in this case far 
overshadows Gaskin’s comment.   
 
With respect to the third Lore factor, the District Court 
gave a strong curative instruction following Gaskin’s 
comment and then another in the final instructions.  “A jury is 
ordinarily assumed to follow clear instructions from the trial 
judge.”  Carney, 461 F.2d at 467.  While we acknowledge the 
prejudicial nature of Gaskin’s outburst, given the evidence in 
the case and the curative instructions, we are confident that 
the statement was not so prejudicial as to deprive Shavers of a 
fair trial.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Shavers’s motion for a mistrial.10
 
   
VIII. The Confrontation Clause 
 
 White maintains that the District Court violated his 
right to confrontation by admitting Gist’s testimony about a 
                                              
10  White and Lewis both join this claim for relief but 
do not explain how Gaskin’s statement was prejudicial with 
respect to them.  Nonetheless, we are satisfied that any 
minimal prejudice that Gaskin’s statement had on White or 
Lewis was easily cured by the Court’s two instructions. 
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statement that Lewis made to her that implicated White and 
Shavers in the robbery.  Gist testified that Lewis and others 
used to spend time at her home.  On the morning of the 
speakeasy robbery, she came downstairs and found Lewis and 
three other men in her home.  One of the men, not Lewis, was 
counting money.  Lewis related to Gist that he had injured his 
forehead while hiding under a children’s pool the night 
before.  When asked whether Lewis divulged what he had 
been doing that night, Gist testified that Lewis “didn’t say 
exactly what he was doing, but he just stated that F  [referring 
to White] and Butts [referring to Shavers] had got locked up.  
They had got caught trying to rob, I think a speakeasy or 
something.”  JA 1308.  White argues that Gist’s testimony 
about Lewis’s statement violated his right to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment.  
 
Because the appellants did not raise a Confrontation 
Clause objection to this evidence in the District Court, it is 
reviewed for plain error.  United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 
335, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2001).  To satisfy the plain error 
standard, the defendant must prove that there was (1) an error; 
(2) that is plain, i.e., obvious under the law at the time of 
review; and (3) that “affect[s] substantial rights.”  Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467–68 (1997).  If those 
conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to order 
correction, but only if the error “seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. at 467.  An error is considered to have 
affected substantial rights when it “‘affected the outcome of 
the district court proceedings.’”  United States v. Vazquez-
Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 
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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), we 
have held that a witness’s statement implicates the 
Confrontation Clause only if it is testimonial.  United States 
v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2012).  Under Bruton 
v. United States, using a non-testifying codefendant’s 
confession violates a defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  391 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1968).  
Critically, we have asserted that, “because Bruton is no more 
than a by-product of the Confrontation Clause, the Court’s 
holdings in Davis and Crawford likewise limit Bruton to 
testimonial statements.”  Berrios
 
, 676 F.3d at 128.   
In view of our holding in Berrios, we conclude that 
Gist’s testimony did not contravene White’s Confrontation 
Clause rights.  In Berrios, we considered a conversation 
between Reinaldo Berrios and one of his codefendants, Troy 
Moore, that was recorded as part of an unrelated 
investigation.  Id. at 124.  The conversation incriminated 
Berrios, Moore, and a third codefendant, who challenged 
admission of the recorded conversation on Confrontation 
Clause grounds.  Id. at 125.  We held that the recorded 
statements bore “none of the characteristics exhibited by 
testimonial statements” because there was no evidence that 
Berrios and Moore intended to incriminate their 
codefendants, that they were aware that their conversation 
was being recorded, or that “their conversation consisted of 
anything but ‘casual remark[s] to an acquaintance.’”  Id. at 
128 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).  The attributes of a 
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testimonial statement are lacking here as well.  There is no 
indication or argument that Lewis intended to incriminate 
Shavers and White or anticipated that Gist would be called to 
testify against them.  Nor is there any suggestion that the 
conversation amounted to more than simply a “casual remark 
to an acquaintance.”  Id.  Finally, Gist’s casual elicitation of 
Lewis’s remarks bears no resemblance to the abusive 
governmental investigation tactics that the Sixth Amendment 
seeks to prevent.11
 
  Thus, we are satisfied that the admission 
of Lewis’s statements does not compel reversal of the 
appellants’ convictions.   
IX. The Mandatory Minimum Sentences Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924 
 
We turn to the argument, joined by all three appellants, 
that the District Court’s imposition of the seven-year 
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) was unconstitutional without a finding by 
the jury that the appellants brandished firearms during the 
robbery.  While the appellants acknowledge that Supreme 
Court precedent forecloses relief on this claim, they raise the 
issue to preserve it for future review.   
 
We exercise plenary review over allegations of 
constitutional violations in sentencing.  United States v. 
Lennon
                                              
11  Shavers originally made this argument as well but 
has since submitted a letter to the Court pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) stating that he no longer 
seeks relief on this ground in light of our decision in Berrios.   
, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2004).  The appellants 
were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which 
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imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years in 
addition to the punishment for the underlying crime on a 
perpetrator who brandishes a firearm “during and in relation 
to” any federal crime of violence.  The verdict form tasked 
the jury with deciding whether the appellants had used or 
carried firearms during and in relation to the robbery.  The 
jury found in the affirmative.  At sentencing, the District 
Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
appellants had not only carried, but brandished firearms 
during the robbery.  Accordingly, the Court included the 
seven-year mandatory minimum set forth in 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) in the appellants’ sentences.  The 
appellants argue that the seven-year minimum sentence 
cannot be constitutionally imposed without a finding by the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that they brandished firearms, 
and that the lower burden of proof applied by the District 
Court violated their right to due process under the Fifth 
Amendment and their right to a jury under the Sixth 
Amendment.   
 
In support of their argument, the appellants rely on 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Supreme Court held 
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  The 
Supreme Court has held, however, that “brandishing” a 
firearm is a sentencing factor and not an element of the crime 
described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  Allowing the judge to 
find that factor by a preponderance of the evidence does not 
violate a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002).  The 
Supreme Court in Harris v. United States explained that the 
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“brandishing” provision does not violate the Apprendi rule 
because the mandatory minimum provisions in § 924 do not 
extend a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum 
sentence, which is “well in excess of seven years.”  Id. at 554, 
567–68; see also United States v. Shabazz
 
, 564 F.3d 280, 
288–89 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Harris remains good law and has been subsequently 
relied upon and cited by the Supreme Court and this Court.  
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2179–80 
(2010); United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 
2008).12
                                              
12  Shavers argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Cunningham v. California, undermines its reliance in Harris 
on the traditional role of the sentencing court in fact-finding.  
549 U.S. 270, 289, 293 (2007).  In Cunningham, the Court 
reversed the California Supreme Court’s holding that 
California’s determinate sentencing law did not contravene 
the Sixth Amendment.  The Court rejected the California 
court’s pronouncement that the law “simply authorize[s] a 
sentencing court to engage in the type of factfinding that 
traditionally has been incident to the judge’s selection of an 
appropriate sentence within a statutorily prescribed 
sentencing range.”  Id. at 289.  Cunningham is distinguishable 
from Harris, however, because the California statute provided 
three levels of fixed sentence terms at six, twelve, and sixteen 
years of imprisonment.  Id. at 275.  The California statute 
violated Apprendi because it allowed the court, by finding 
additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence, to 
enhance a sentence into a tier higher than that justified by the 
jury’s finding.  To the contrary, the sentencing enhancements 
in § 924 do not dictate a sentence above the maximum 
  Given that the Supreme Court squarely addressed 
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this issue in Harris
 
 and held that brandishing is a sentencing 
factor to be found by the judge, the appellants’ argument does 
not provide a basis for reversal.  
X. Shavers’s Term of Supervised Release 
 
Finally, Shavers contends that his eight-year term of 
supervised release exceeds the statutory maximum of five 
years for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  For a 
felony conviction pursuant to § 924(c), which is a Class A 
felony, the maximum length of supervised release is five 
years.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(1), 3583(b)(1); United States v. 
Cudjoe, 634 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Todd, 521 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2008).  Shavers is 
correct, therefore, that his sentence of eight years of 
supervised release exceeds the statutory maximum term of 
supervised release for the offense of conviction.  Because that 
constitutes plain error, we will vacate Shavers’s sentence and 
remand to the District Court for resentencing.  See United 
States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Our 
precedent is clear that a plainly erroneous condition of 
supervised release always affects a defendant’s substantial 
rights.”).13
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
sentence for the offense as found by the jury.  The Court dealt 
with a different statutory structure in Cunningham and, 
therefore, that case does not provide support for overruling 
Harris.   
13  Although Lewis joins this argument, his term of 
supervised release was five years and he has no basis for this 
claim.   
66 
 
XI. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, we will vacate 
Shavers’s eight-year term of supervised release and Shavers’s 
and White’s witness tampering convictions.  We will uphold 
the convictions of all three appellants on all other counts and 
affirm Lewis’s sentence.  We will remand for the 
resentencing of Shavers and White in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
